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LESLIE K. BRAUN v. JEFFREY DAVID HEADLEY 
No. 0405, September Term, 1999 
COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND 
2000 Md. App. LEXIS 73 
April 26, 2000, Filed 
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1] APPEAL FROM THE Circuit 
Court for Harford County. Cypert O. Whitfill, JUDGE. 
DISPOSITION: JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO 
BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 
CORE TERMS: relocation, custody, right to travel, con-
stitutional right to travel, travel, custodial parent, mate-
rial change, visitation, best interest, custodial, impli-
cated, relocating, modification, addressing, frequent, 
residents, asthma, constitutional right, forty-five, relo-
cate, trigger, mile, interplay, diagnosis, compelling state 
interest, constitutional rights, non-custodial, modified, 
distance, enjoyed 
COUNSEL: ARGUED BY: Francis A. Pommett, III of 
Baltimore, MD, FOR APPELLANT. 
ARGUED BY: Todd K. Mohink (Law Offices of David 
L. Ruben on the brief) all of Ellicott City, MD, FOR 
APPELLEE. 
JUDGES: ARGUED BEFORE DAVIS, HOLLANDER, 
and ADKINS, JJ. Opinion by ADKINS, J. 
OPINIONBY: ADKINS 
OPINION: 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
We must determine in this appeal whether the Court 
of Appeals's decision in Domingues v. Johnson, 323 
Md. 486, 593 A.2d 1133 (1991), which holds that the 
relocation of a child may constitute a change in circum-
stances sufficient to trigger a review of custody, applies a 
standard that violates a custodial parent's constitutional 
right to travel. Relying on the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S. 
Q. 1518, 143 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1999), appellant ar-
gues that the Domingues standards must be modified, 
nl Appellant further argues that we should reverse the 
decision of the Circuit Court for Harford County to 
transfer custody from Leslie K. Braun, appellant, to 
Jeffrey David Headley, appellee, after appellant's re-
location from Maryland to Arizona, because the change 
in custody was not in the best interests of the child. 
nl Appellant points out that she did not make an 
argument based on Saenz in the trial court because 
Saenz was not decided until after the trial of this case. 
In light of the timing of the Saenz decision, and in 
order to provide guidance to lower courts, we will 
exercise our discretion to decide the issue pursuant 
to Maryland Rule 8-131. 
[*2] 
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 
The minor child, Theresa, was born on November 
11, 1993. Appellant filed a complaint to prove pa-
ternity and establish child support on May 11, 1994, 
naming appellee as the father. Following the determina-
tion that appellee was the father, custody was awarded 
to appellant and appellee was ordered to pay approxi-
mately $ 316 monthly in child support. n2 Appellee was 
granted reasonable visitation, and subsequently, a visi-
tation schedule was established. The visitation order of 
March 7, 1995, initially granted appellee visitation from 
9:00 a.m. Saturday morning until 9:00 p.m. Saturday 
evening for two consecutive Saturdays, and then every 
other weekend with rotating holidays. 
n2 Arrears were established at the amount of $ 
1,645 as of October 21, 1994, and were to be paid 
back at $31.58 monthly. 
On October 16, 1998, appellant moved to Arizona. 
On that same date, appellant filed a complaint to mod-
ify visitation stating that due to her "chronic pain" and 
"illness," she had "decided [*3] to move" to a "dryer cli-
mate, which [would] enable her to better tolerate her var-
2000 Md. App. LEXIS 73, *3 
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ious health problems." Appellant also contended in the 
motion that visitation should thereafter "be conditioned 
on [appellee] paying all transportation costs incident to 
such visitation, in advance; or, providing round-trip 
airline tickets for each scheduled visitation." Appellee 
filed an answer and a counter-complaint for sole cus-
tody and/or for modification of custody, requesting an 
emergency custody hearing. A hearing was set for and 
held on December 16, 1998, and the matter was con-
tinued. On December 17, 1998, the court ordered that 
assessments of both parties and Theresa be conducted 
by the Office of Family Court Services. On January 
26, 1999, the hearing was held to receive the report of 
John Mahlmann, Ph.D, of the Office of Family Court 
Services. Dr. Mahlmann interviewed the parties and 
Theresa, and recommended that "both parties attend the 
Divorce Education Program" and that each party have 
a "psychological evaluation." After receiving the report 
from the doctor, the court concluded that a trial was nec-
essary. The court ordered that appellant, appellee, and 
Theresa each have a psychological [*4] evaluation by 
Dr. Michael Gombatz, and the evaluations were sched-
uled. n3 Subsequently, the court appointed an attorney 
for Theresa. A two-day trial was held in mid-April. 
n3 Appellee was ordered to pay the cost of these 
evaluations, not to exceed $ 1,500. 
At the trial, Dr. Gombatz's report was admitted into 
evidence. Dr. Gombatz reported that on February 23, 
1999, for the scheduled joint interview with both par-
ties, appellant "was approximately a half hour to an hour 
late." He stated that appellant "interrupted several times" 
during appellee's presentation. He stated that appellant 
was "inflexible unless it was to her advantage," and that 
she "was consistently vague and non-responsive . . . 
[and] it appeared that [appellant] did deny [appellee] visi-
tation, rationalizing the reasons for it." After conversing 
with Dr. Mahlmann, Dr. Gombatz reported that there 
was no record of any current significant health condi-
tions facing Theresa, contradicting appellant's diagnosis 
that Theresa had asthma. Nor was Theresa [*5] being 
treated for asthma. When questioned by Dr. Gombatz 
as to why she "appeared not to be telling me the truth?" 
appellant answered: "It is very oppressive. I'm tired of 
it." 
The doctor also conducted individual evaluation ses-
sions of each of the parties, first with Theresa, and then 
alone. Again, appellant "arrived over an hour late" for 
the appointment, and stated that, "It was not my fault." 
When Dr. Gombatz interviewed Theresa alone, appel-
lant, "instead of going into the waiting room like I asked, 
[] put her ear against the door in an attempt to listen to 
our conversation." Shortly after the questioning began, 
the doctor left the office to get appellant and "was star-
tled to see her standing by the door." Dr. Gombatz 
reported that appellant "started berating" him regarding 
his questioning of Theresa. 
Dr. Gombatz reported that appellee's "clinical profile 
was essentially within normal limits" and his "projective 
testing is valid." In contrast, appellant's clinical pro-
file suggests borderline-narcissistic personality disorder. 
Her scores suggest deficits in mood stability, relation-
ships and particularly with her own sense of identity. . . 
. She tends to experience intense emotions [*6] and fre-
quent mood swings with recurring periods of depression, 
anxiety and anger followed by dejection and apathy. . . 
. In addition, [appellant] is quite self-centered. She has 
an expectation entitlement which, if given the opportu-
nity she will exploit people and manipulate them. She . 
. . thinks primarily of herself. . . . Projective testing 
indicates she has deficiencies in her capacity for control 
and tolerance for stress. 
Dr. Gombatz recommended that appellee "is the 
more competent parent and Theresa's interests would 
be served if custody and placement were with him." His 
reasons included his finding that appellant acts "as if 
Theresa is her property . . . rather than a young girl 
whose development is to be fostered." He further re-
ported: (1) "There is . . . no doubt in my mind that 
the move to Arizona was precipitated by a desire to limit 
Theresa's contact with her birth father. The claim that 
she moved to Arizona for Theresa's medical benefit. . . 
has no merit;" (2) appellee "has a healthier relationship 
with Theresa than" appellant; and (3) appellee "would 
likely be much fairer in allowing Theresa contact with 
[appellant] than [she] would be with him." 
Both appellant [*7] and appellee testified at trial, as 
well as other witnesses called by each side. Appellee 
described the circumstances of appellant's move to 
Arizona, and how she notified him by telephone mes-
sage on her day of departure that she was leaving, but 
failed to provide any information about her new resi-
dence until about six weeks later. After appellee learned 
of appellant's new residence and telephone number, he 
made frequent attempts to call Theresa, but appellant 
substantially and repeatedly interfered with his ability 
to speak with the child. Appellee also described how 
Theresa would not call him dad or other appropriate 
name, and addressed him without any appellation. Wade 
Headley, Theresa's paternal grandfather, testified that 
Theresa said that "if I call him Daddy, I will get pun-
ished at home." Appellee's mother also described how 
appellant made Theresa give away toys and other gifts, 
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including a picture painted by her, that were given to 
Theresa by her paternal grandparents. Appellee testified 
that Matthew, appellant's son from another relationship, 
repeatedly referred to him as "Doo-doo." 
Appellant described the early history of Theresa's life, 
and emphasized how appellee had originally [*8] de-
nied his paternity of Theresa. She ascribed her move to 
Arizona to health reasons, explaining that she thought 
that Theresa had asthma, and that the drier climate would 
be better for Theresa. n4 Although Theresa's medical 
records were introduced into evidence, appellant was un-
able to point to any indication in the records that Theresa 
suffered from asthma. She testified that Theresa did not 
like to visit with her father. She acknowledged giving 
away the gifts from Theresa's grandparents, indicating 
that she did not have sufficient room in her residence to 
store all the "junk" that a child accumulated. She ac-
knowledged that Matthew referred to appellee as "Doo-
Doo." 
n4 Although in her complaint appellant asserted 
that the move was to improve her personal health, 
she offered no evidence to support this claim, other 
than a statement that she had done general research 
and learned that a drier climate was beneficial to 
health. 
On April 20, 1999, the court issued an opinion from 
the bench that awarded custody of [*9] Theresa to ap-
pellee, and reserved visitation with appellant "until fur-
ther order of this court." This appeal was timely noted. 
Additional facts will be added as necessary to our dis-
cussion of the issues. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Standard of Review 
A trial court cannot, in the exercise of its discretionary 
power, infringe upon constitutional rights enjoyed by the 
parties. SttLewisv. Warden, 16 Md. App. 339, 342, 
296A.2d 428 (1972). Because appellant asserts that her 
right to travel under the United States Constitution is 
implicated, our standard of review in considering this 
issue (in Section II of this opinion) shall be an inde-
pendent constitutional appraisal. See Ebert v. Md. St. 
Bd. of Censors, 19 Md. App. 300, 316, 313 A.2d 536 
(1973). 
Our review of the issue of whether the trial court erred 
in holding that the best interests of Theresa called for 
an award of custody to appellee shall be governed by 
the abuse of discretion standard. The determination of 
which parent should be awarded custody rests within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. See Robinson v. 
Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 513, 615 A.2d 1190 (1992). 
The court's exercise [*10] of discretion must be guided 
first, and foremost, by what it believes would promote 
the child's best interest. See Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md. 
165, 170, 411 A.2d 1028 (1980). Additionally, the trial 
court's opportunity to observe the demeanor and credi-
bility of both the parties and the witnesses is of particular 
importance. See Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 470, 
648 A.2d 1016 (1994). 
When a trial court finds that the moving party has 
satisfied the burden and established a justification for a 
change in custody, those findings must be accorded great 
deference on appeal, and will only be disturbed if they 
are plainly arbitrary or clearly erroneous. See Scott v. 
Dep't of Social Services, 76 Md. App. 357, 382-83, 
545 A.2d 81, cert, denied, 314Md. 193, 550A.2d381 
(1988). 
II. 
Custody and Right to Travel 
Appellant argues that the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Saenz, supra, requires a change in Maryland law 
respecting the consideration of one parent's relocation 
of residence for purposes of deciding whether custody 
should be modified. She contends that the Domingues 
holding that relocation [*11] of residence by a parent 
could itself constitute the basis for a finding of a material 
change in circumstances is no longer valid. She asserts 
that the Domingues standard violates a person's con-
stitutional right to travel, as recently defined in Saenz. 
Appellant insists that in the present case the court ordered 
a change of custody based exclusively on her relocation, 
thereby violating her constitutional rights. We hold, for 
the reasons set forth below, that the standards established 
by the Court of Appeals in Domingues do not violate the 
rights of a custodial parent to travel. 
The Domingues Court was called upon to evaluate 
our holding in Jordan v. Jordan, 50 Md. App. 437, 
439A.2d26, cert, denied, 293 Md. 332 (1982), that 
relocation of a parent cannot constitute the basis for a 
modification of custody. See Domingues, 323 Md. at 
500. In so doing, the Court examined our statement in 
Jordan that "relocating as a result of remarriage, em-
ployment and the like cannot of itself render a parent to 
whom custody has been granted unfit and thereby con-
stitute the basis for a modification of custody." Id. at 
500 [* 12] (quoting Jordan, 50 Md. App. at 447, in turn 
2000 Md. App. LEXIS 73, *12 
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quoting Hoyt v. Boyer, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2135, 
2135-36 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Sullivan County, 1979), mod-
ified on other grounds, 77 A.D.2d 685 (1980)). The 
Court, overruling our holding in Jordan, observed: 
The statement approved by the Court of Special Appeals 
strikes us as far too absolute in its terms. In the first 
place, it is not necessary that a parent be declared unfit 
before joint or sole custody can be changed from that 
parent. Moreover, changes brought about by the relo-
cation of a parent may, in a given case, be sufficient to 
justify a change in custody. The result depends upon the 
circumstances of each case. 
The understandable desire of judges and attorneys to 
find bright-line rules to guide them in this most diffi-
cult area of the law does not justify the creation of hard 
and fast rules where they are inappropriate. Indeed, the 
very difficulty of the decision-making process in cus-
tody cases flows in large part from the uniqueness of 
each case, the extraordinarily broad spectrum of facts 
that may have to be considered in any given case, and 
the inherent difficulty of formulating [*13] bright-line 
rules of universal applicability in this area of the law. 
Domingues, 323 Md. at 500-01. 
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
a citizen's right to travel between states, see e.g., Dunn 
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 
2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 
89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969), overruled 
in part, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 US. 651, 94 S. Ct. 
1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974). This right includes 
the right "to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start 
a new life . . . ." Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629, 89 S. 
Ct. at 1328. Although the treatment and handling of 
a custodial parent's decision to relocate has been ad-
dressed by many jurisdictions, see Carol S. Bruch and 
Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and 
Custodial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 
Fam. L.Q. 245 (1996) (and cases cited therein), only 
a few courts have considered how the custodial par-
ent's right to travel plays a role in a court's decision re-
garding custody under these circumstances. See Tabitha 
Sample and Teresa Reiger, [*14] Relocation Standards 
and Constitutional Considerations, 10 J. Am. Acad. 
Matrim. Law. 229, 237 (1998) ("Sample and Reiger"). 
Like many other states, our Court of Appeals has thor-
oughly addressed the issue of relocation by a custodial 
parent, and has clearly set forth the standard and bur-
den of proof involved in making determinations of this 
issue, see Domingues, supra; McCready v. McCready, 
323 Md. 476, 593 A.2d 1128 (1991), but has not been 
called upon to address the constitutional right to travel 
in this context. n5 
n5 The constitutional right to travel was asserted 
before this court in Schaefer v. Cusack, 124 Md. 
App. 288, 722 A.2d 73 (1998), but was not our 
basis for decision. In Schaefer we reviewed a trial 
court order awarding custody of a minor child to one 
parent for a period of years, but changing custody 
to the father when the child completed fifth grade. 
The order also required that the parents live within 
forty-five miles of each other. The mother, who was 
awarded custody, appealed from the order, contest-
ing, inter alia, the requirement that she live within 
forty-five miles of the father. She asserted several 
constitutional rights, including the right to travel, as 
well as arguing that the trial court had no jurisdiction 
to grant such request. We struck down the forty-five 
mile limitation, holding that "the best interest of the 
child can be determined better at the time a reloca-
tion is proposed than in an attempt to look into the 
future and to say now that the best interest of the 
child requires a present determination that a sepa-
ration of the parents by more than forty-five miles 
would have an adverse effect upon the child." Id. at 
307. We did not address the constitutional right to 
travel argument. 
[*15] 
The right to travel is not explicitly set forth in the 
United States Constitution, but the Supreme Court "long 
ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and 
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to 
require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the 
length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, 
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or re-
strict this movement." Shapiro, supra, 394 U.S. at 629, 
89 S. Ct. at 1329. 
The Supreme Court's Saenz Decision 
The Supreme Court revisited the right to travel in 
Saenz, supra, when the Court was called upon to in-
terpret the constitutionality of a statute that limited the 
maximum welfare benefits available to state residents 
who had resided in a state under twelve months. Under 
the statute, residents would receive only the amount of 
benefits they would have received in the state of their 
prior residence for the first year that they resided in their 
new home state. Two California residents filed an action 
challenging the minimum residency requirement of the 
statute. 
California argued that the statute was not enacted for 
the purpose of inhibiting migration [*16] and that "it 
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does not penalize the right to travel because new arrivals 
are not ineligible for benefits during their first year of 
residence." Saenz, 526 U.S. at ,119 S. Ct. at 1525. 
The state further argued that it would save millions of 
dollars in annual welfare costs, and that this "was an 
appropriate exercise of budgetary authority as long as 
the residency requirement did not penalize the right to 
travel." Id. at , 119 S. Ct. at 1523. California argued 
that the statute should be upheld if it is supported by a 
rational basis and the state's interest in saving millions 
of dollars meets that test. See id. at ,119 S. Ct. at 
1525. 
The Supreme Court took this opportunity to address 
the issue of the right to travel. According to Saenz, "the 
word 'travel' is not found in the text of the Constitution. 
Yet the 'constitutional right to travel from one State to 
another' is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence." Id. 
at ,119 S. Ct. at 1524 (citation omitted). "The right 
is so important that it is 'assertable against private inter-
ference as well as governmental action . . . a virtually 
unconditional personal [*17] right. . . . '"Id. (quoting 
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643, 89 S. Ct. at 1336 (Stewart, 
J. concurring)). 
The right to travel "embraces at least three different 
components." 526 U.S. at ,119 S. Ct. at 1525. The 
Court explained the components as: (1) the right of a cit-
izen of one state to enter and leave another state; (2) the 
right of a citizen of one state "to be treated as a welcome 
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporar-
ily present" in the state; and (3) "for those travelers 
who elect to become permanent residents, the right to 
be treated like other citizens of" the state. Id. Although 
the precise source of this right is obscure, see Shapiro, 
394 U.S. at 630 n.8, 89 S. Ct. at 1329 n.8, it orig-
inated out of concern over state discrimination against 
outsiders, rather than concerns over the general ability 
to travel interstate. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at ,119 S. 
Ct. at 1524. 
In contrast to appellant, the Saenz plaintiffs were the 
subject of discrimination because their rights to welfare 
benefits from the state were automatically limited by 
their move to California, regardless of their need for 
[*18] welfare. As the Court said: 
Neither the duration of respondents' California resi-
dence, nor the identity of their prior States of residence, 
has any relevance to their need for benefits. Nor do 
those factors bear any relationship to the State's inter-
est in making an equitable allocation of the funds to be 
distributed among its needy citizens. 
Id. at , 119 S. Ct. at 1528. 
The component of the right to travel implicated in 
Saenz rests on the first sentence of Article IV, § 2 of 
the Constitution, which provides: "The Citizens of each 
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States." It was the "third aspect 
of the right to travel - the right of the newly arrived 
citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed 
by other citizens of the same State," id. at ,119 S. 
Ct. at 1526, that was implicated by the discriminatory 
welfare classification. The welfare classification based 
on duration of residence was held a violation of the right 
to travel and a penalty "since the right to travel embraces 
the citizen's right to be treated equally in her new State 
of residence. . . ." Id. at , [*19] 119 S. Ct. at 1527. 
In contrast, the Domingues Court created no discrimi-
natory classification between those who are already res-
idents of a state, and those who migrate to that state for 
residence. n6 The Court simply recognized that a de-
termination of custody is a multi-faceted decision, but 
that the best interests of the child must override all other 
competing interests, including the parent's interest in re-
taining custody, if a relocation would be adverse to the 
child. For this reason, we do not see Saenz as shedding 
new light on the subject of how the right to travel should 
interplay with the concerns of a court in addressing the 
best interests of the child in the context of a custodial 
parent's relocation. 
n6 The constitutional right to travel was not 
asserted by the relocating custodial parent in 
Domingues. 
The Constitutional Right to Travel Is Qualified 
We think, however, that the constitutional right to 
travel should not be ignored in custody decisions in-
volving the decision [*20] of one parent to relocate. Our 
research discloses only a few other jurisdictions in which 
the constitutional right to travel was asserted to defend 
against a change in custody based on a proposed relo-
cation by the custodial parent. In the few cases that we 
have found where the constitutional right to travel was 
asserted, the court found that the right was implicated 
under such circumstances. See LaChapelle v. Mitten, 
607N.W.2dl51,163 (Minn. App. 2000); In Re Custody 
ofD.M.G.andT.J.G., 1998MT1, 951 P.2d 1377, 1381, 
287 Mont. 120 (Mont. 1998) In Re Marriage of Cole, 
224 Mont. 207, 729 R2d 1276, 1280 (Mont. 1986); 
Jaramillov. Jaramillo, 113N.M. 57, 823R2d299, 304 
(N.M. 1991); In Re Marriage of Sheley, 78 Wn. App. 
494, 895 P. 2d 850 (Wish. App. 1995); overturned on 
other grounds, In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 
39, 940 R2d 1362 (Wash. 1999); Witt v. Watt, 971 
2000 Md. App. LEXIS 73, *20 
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R2d 608, 615-16 (Wyo. 1999). See also Sample and 
Reiger, supra; Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the 
Right to Travel: Legal and Psychological Implications, 
24 J. Fam. L. 625, 630-638 [*21] (1985-86) ("Raines"); 
Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A 
Constitutional Perspective, 34 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 
1, 67-80 (1995-96) ("LaFrance"). 
Most of these cases, in recognizing the role of the con-
stitutional right to travel, hold that the right to travel is 
qualified, and must be subject to the state's compelling 
interest in protecting the best interests of the child by ap-
plication of the best interests standard. See LaChapelle, 
607N.W.2dl51; Cole, 224Mont. 207, 729R2d 1276; 
D.M.G., 1998 MT1, 951 R2d 1377, 287Mont. 120; 
Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 823 R2d 299; cf. Sheley, 78 
Wn. App. 494, 895 P. 2d 850 (right to travel is qualified 
by state's compelling interest in protecting best inter-
ests of children, but to meet constitutional test, requires 
showing of detriment to child if relocation is made). 
Only one case, Watt, finds a "best interests" analysis 
insufficient recognition of the parental right to travel, 
and holds that the threshold requirement that a material 
change of circumstances exists, which triggers the best 
interest analysis, cannot be established merely by [*22] 
proving relocation of the custodial parent. In Watt, the 
Supreme Court of Wyoming placed a higher priority on 
the constitutional right to travel than other states dis-
cussing the right: 
The constitutional question posed is whether the rights 
of a parent and the duty of the courts to adjudicate cus-
tody serve as a premise for restricting or inhibiting the 
freedom to travel of a citizen of the State of Wyoming 
and of the United States of America. We hold this to 
be impossible. The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen 
carries with it the right of a custodial parent to have 
the children move with that parent. This right is not 
to be denied, impaired, or disparaged unless clear evi-
dence before the court demonstrates another substantial 
and material change of circumstance and establishes the 
detrimental effect of the move upon the children. While 
relocation certainly may be stressful to a child, the nor-
mal anxieties of a change of residence and the inherent 
difficulties that the increase in geographical distance be-
tween parents imposes are not considered to be 'detri-
mental' factors. 
971 P.2d at 615-16 (citations omitted). 
The other cases addressing the constitutional right of 
travel, [*23] and its interplay with the best interests stan-
dard accord a lower priority to the constitutional right, 
and in doing so, apply standards that are consistent with 
the Court of Appeals decision in Domingues. 
The intermediate appellate court of Minnesota has rec-
ognized that the constitutional right to travel is impli-
cated in child custody disputes involving relocation, but 
the right must be balanced against the state's interests in 
protecting the best interests of the child: 
The right to travel includes the right to 'live and settle 
down anywhere one chooses in this country without be-
ing disadvantaged because of that choice.' The nature 
of the disadvantage or hardship involved is important to 
the level of review a restriction on the right to travel 
receives. In this case the hardship imposed on [the cus-
todial parent] is the loss of sole physical custody of her 
daughter if she does not return to Minnesota. This im-
plicates the fundamental right to raise one's child, which 
triggers the application of strict scrutiny. 
The deprivation of fundamental rights is subject to 
strict scrutiny and may only be upheld if justified by 
a compelling state interest. The compelling state [*24] 
interest in this case is the protection of the best interests 
of the child. 
LaChapelle, 607N. W.2d at 163 (citations omitted). In 
rejecting an equal protection argument by the mother, 
the court reasoned: 
The equal protection guarantees prevent the government 
from making distinctions among people when applying 
the law unless the distinction serves a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest. In Minnesota, custody decisions are 
based on the best interests of the child. The focus in 
applying the best-interests standard is on the child, not 
the parents, and therefore the standard applies equally 
to all parents. 
607N.W.2d at 165; cf. Cole, 729 R2d at 1280 (fur-
thering the "best interests of the child, by assuring the 
maximum opportunities for the love, guidance and sup-
port of both natural parents may constitute a compelling 
state interest," but "interference with the fundamental 
right" to travel must be made "cautiously"). 
In Jaramillo, the parties, as part of their divorce pro-
ceedings, entered a stipulation that they would share 
joint legal custody of their daughter, Monica, which pro-
vided that Monica was to reside with [*25] her mother 
each week, and with her father on alternate week-ends, 
Wednesdays, and certain holidays. The mother advised 
the father that she planned to move from New Mexico, 
where the parties both lived, to New Hampshire, "where 
her parents lived and where she believed she could find 
steadier and more remunerative employment." 823 R2d 
at 301. In the custody litigation that followed, both 
parents sought primary physical custody. In addressing 
2000 Md. App. LEXIS 73, *25 
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the interplay between the constitutional right to travel 
and the competing concerns of the state ~ in the best 
interests of the child, and the non-custodial parent - in 
maintaining close association and frequent contact with 
the child, the Supreme Courtof New Mexico said: 
The protection afforded the right to travel in the child-
custody context has been explicitly recognized by . . . 
this C o u r t . . . . It makes no difference that the parent 
who wishes to relocate is not prohibited outright from 
doing so; a legal rule that operates to chill the exercise 
of the right, absent a sufficient state interest to do so, is 
as impermissible as one that bans exercise of the right 
altogether. 
* * * 
By the same token, we believe that [*26] the other par-
ent's right to maintain his or her close association and 
frequent contact with the child should be equally free 
from any unfavorable presumption that would place him 
or her under the burden of showing that the proposed 
removal of the child would be contrary to the child's 
best interests. 'Freedom of personal choice in matters 
of family life is a fundamental liberty interest.' Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394, 
71 L.Ed. 2d 599 (1982). 
823 P.2d at 305-06 (citations omitted). 
The court rejected the notion that a relocation after the 
parents' divorce is presumptively contrary to the child's 
best interest, saying: 
We think that such a presumption is potentially just 
as inimical to the child's best interests as the opposite 
presumption favoring the relocating parent and burden-
ing the resisting parent with the requirement that he or 
she prove that the move would be contrary to the child's 
best interests. 
Id. at 307. 
It went on to explain why neither a presumption in fa-
vor of, nor a presumption against the custodial parent's 
right to relocate should be indulged: 
Neither presumption . . . serves the . . . goal [*27] . 
. . of determining and implementing the best interests 
of the child. [One] presumption prefers the interest of 
the remaining parent to that of the relocating parent; the 
opposite presumption reverses the preferences assigned 
to these interests. Both presumptions are subject to the 
following criticism leveled by the United States Supreme 
Court several years ago at 'procedure by presumption': 
Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier 
than individualized determination. But when, as here, 
the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of com-
petence and care, when it explicitly disdains present re-
alities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks 
running roughshod over the important interests of both 
parent and child. It therefore cannot stand. 
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57, 92 
S. Ct. 1208, 1215, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)). 
Id. (citations omitted). It went on to adopt the rule 
that "neither party is under a burden to prove which ar-
rangement will best promote the child's interests; both 
parents share equally the burden of demonstrating how 
the child's best interests will be served." 823 P.2d at 
308. In adopting [*28] this rule, it recognized that: 
Either party can initiate a proceeding to alter an exist-
ing custody arrangement on the ground that a substantial 
and material change in circumstances affecting the wel-
fare of the child has occurred or is about to occur, and 
the party seeking such change has the burden to show 
that the existing arrangement is no longer workable. In 
almost every case in which the change in circumstances 
is occasioned by one parent's proposed relocation, the 
proposed move will establish the substantiality and ma-
teriality of the change. It then becomes incumbent on the 
trial court to consider as much information as the parties 
choose to submit, or to elicit further information on its 
own motion from the sources mentioned above or such 
other sources as the court may have available, and to 
decide what new arrangement will serve the child's best 
interest. In such a proceeding neither parent will have 
the burden to show that relocation of the child with the 
removing parent will be in or contrary to the child's best 
interests. Each party will have the burden to persuade 
the court that the new custody arrangement or parenting 
plan proposed by him or her should be adopted by [*29] 
the court, but that party's failure to carry this burden 
will only mean that the court remains free to adopt the 
arrangement or plan that it determines best promotes the 
child's interests. 
Id. at 309. 
After review of the Supreme Court decisions in Saenz 
and Shapiro, the out of state cases addressing the issue, 
as well as commentary on the issue, n7 we conclude that 
the standard set forth in Domingues for deciding cus-
tody disputes involving a parental relocation does not 
interfere with a custodial parent's right to travel. The 
Supreme Court has given no indication that the constitu-
tional right to travel should be paramount over the state's 
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interest in preserving the best interests of the children. 
Indeed, the state's duty to protect the interests of minor 
children has been recognized by the Supreme Court as 
"duty of the highest order." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 
429, 433, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421 
(1984). 
n7 We have reviewed several articles discussing the 
constitutional right to travel and how it is or should 
be applied in custody determinations. See Sample 
and Reiger, supra; LaFrance, supra; Raines, supra. 
[*30] 
We consider the reasoning of the Supreme Court of 
New Mexico in Jaramillo to be the most cogent analysis 
of the appropriate interplay between the constitutional 
right and the family law concerns, because it articulates 
why a presumption favoring either the relocating custo-
dial parent or the non-custodial parent would upset the 
balance that is needed to arrive at a fair determination of 
the child's best interests. There is no constitutional in-
firmity in giving equal status, in determining the child's 
best interests, to (1) the custodial parent's right to travel, 
and the benefit to be given the child from remaining with 
the custodial parent; and (2) the benefit from the non-
custodial parent's exercise of his right to maintain close 
association and frequent contact with the child. 
Treatment of the Right to Travel Under Domingues 
Although the Court of Appeals in Domingues was not 
presented with an argument based on the constitutional 
right to travel, and did not rule on the constitutional is-
sue, it did mention the "right to travel" in its opinion, 
and made reference to commentaries n8 discussing the 
right. In describing the law in other jurisdictions, the 
Court [*31] of Appeals said: 
n8 The Court cited the following commen-
taries: Raines, supra, 24 J. Fam L. 625 (1985-
86); Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce 
Children; Relocation, the Constitution and the 
Courts, 1 Ariz. St. L.J. 1 (1985); Note, Residence 
Restrictions On Custodial Parents: Implications For 
the Right to Travel, 12 Rutgers L.J. 341 (1980). 
All of these commentaries discuss the constitutional 
right to travel. 
In some states the courts jealously protect the right of 
travel, and place a heavy burden upon the parent who 
would challenge the relocation. In other states, the bur-
den is placed upon the parent contemplating relocation to 
show that it would be in the best interest of the child. The 
legislatures of some states have enacted 'anti-removal' 
statutes. 
Domingues, 323 Md. at 501 (citation omitted). 
Further, its reasoning regarding the best way, for non-
constitutional reasons, to determine the best interests of 
the child when proposed relocation [*32] is involved, is 
based on the fundamental concept, also evident in the 
Jaramillo constitutional analysis, that there are no "ab-
solutes" other than the best interests of the child. See 
Domingues, 323 Md. at 501; Jaramillo, 823 R2d at 
309 n.10 ("The respective interests of the parents are 
relevant . . . and should be considered by the court; 
but the interests of the child take precedence over any 
conflicting interest of either parent."). The Court of 
Appeals explained how the competing interests of the 
parents might be viewed differently, depending on the 
circumstances presented: 
The view that a court takes toward relocation may re-
flect an underlying philosophy of whether the interest of 
the child is best served by the certainty and stability of a 
primary caretaker, or by ensuring significant day-to-day 
contact with both parents. Certainly, the relationship 
that exists between the parents and the child before relo-
cation is of critical importance. If one parent has become 
the primary caretaker, and the other parent has become 
an occasional or infrequent visitor, evidencing little in-
terest in day-to-day contact with the child, the adverse 
effects [*33] of a move by the custodial parent will be 
diminished. On the other hand, where both parents are 
interested, and are actively involved with the life of the 
child on a continuing basis, a move of any substantial 
distance may upset a very desirable environment, and 
may not be in the best interest of the child. 
Id. at 501-02. 
We conclude that the approach taken by the Court of 
Appeals in Domingues sufficiently protects the constitu-
tional right to travel because it requires consideration of 
that right, and gives the parent choosing to exercise that 
right an equal footing as the other parent with respect 
to the burden to show the best interests of the children. 
Accordingly, we see no reason, based on Saenz, supra, 
or the right to travel, as recognized in other Supreme 
Court decisions, to modify the standards for consider-
ing relocation cases from that set forth in Domingues. 
III. 
Material Change in Circumstances 
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Appellant argues that under the circumstances of this 
case, her relocation to Arizona did not warrant a mate-
rial change in circumstances sufficient to order a change 
in custody, and that the trial court based its finding of 
change solely [*34] on her relocation. She also asserts 
that she "seems to be extraordinarily adept at rubbing 
people . . . the wrong way" and that the judge's dis-
like for her in conjunction with admiration for appellee 
amounts to a "popularity contest" and was the reason for 
the custody transfer. We disagree. The record makes 
clear that, in deciding to transfer custody, the trial court 
carefully considered all the evidence before it with a 
view towards determining the best interests of the child. 
It considered the relocation to Arizona, and the effect 
the move would have on Theresa. Its decision that the 
change in circumstances, when considered in light of 
Theresa's best interests, warranted a change in custody, 
was well supported by the evidence. 
The threshold issue is the existence of a material 
change. A change of custody resolution is generally 
"a chronological two-step process." Wagner v. Wagner, 
109 Md. App. / , 28, 674 A.2d 1, cert, denied, 343 
Md. 334, 681 A.2d 69 (1996). Initially, unless a mate-
rial change of circumstances is found to exist, the court's 
inquiry must cease. See id. If a material change is found 
to exist, "then the court, in resolving the [*35] custody 
issue, considers the best interest of the child as if it were 
an original custody proceeding." Id. 
In determining whether the change was material we 
look to whether the changes related to the welfare of the 
child. SeeMcCready, supra, 323 Md. at 481. The fac-
tors to be considered in determining custody of a child in-
clude, but [are] not limited to: (1) fitness of the parents; 
(2) character and reputation of the parties; (3) desire of 
the natural parents and agreements between the parties; 
(4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations; 
(5) preference of the child; (6) material opportunities 
affecting the future life of the child; (7) age, health and 
sex of the child; (8) residences of parents and oppor-
tunity for visitation; (9) length of separation from the 
natural parents; and (10) prior voluntary abandonment 
or surrender. 
Montgomery County v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 
420, 381 A.2d 1154 (1978) (citations omitted). As we 
discussed in Section II, changes "brought about by the 
relocation of a parent may, in a given case, be sufficient 
to justify a change in custody." Domingues, 323 Md. 
at 500; see also [*36] Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 89 Md. 
App. 301, 309, 598A.2d482 (1991). 
The record contains considerable evidence that appel-
lant actively sought to interfere with or prevent appellee 
from having a relationship with Theresa, and that she had 
no appreciation for the need of her daughter to have a 
relationship with her father. Further, Dr. Gombatz's re-
port contained significant information regarding appel-
lant's personality that negatively influenced her ability 
to serve as the custodial parent. The trial court consid-
ered Dr. Gombatz's report, and observed that appellant' 
sconduct is totally consistent with the diagnosis that Dr. 
Gombatz had given me so that I used Dr. Gombatz'[s] 
report not as a primary tool in making a decision in this 
case but as a back up tool, as a test, and the diagnosis and 
observations made by Dr. Gombatz are consistent with 
and confirm the observations that I made in this court-
room. The diagnosis of borderline personality disorder 
. . . produces a personality that is extremely difficult 
to work with. 
[Appellant] does what she perceives to be right and 
fair and just and simply doesn't consider what anyone 
else wants . . . . She [acts] with what [*37] is con-
sistent with her own interests and the testimony that I 
heard bears that out and Dr. Gombatz simply confirms 
it. 
The trial court determined that a change in circum-
stances had occurred, and that it was material. The 
court found that: (1) appellant moved to Arizona with 
the intent to "separate the child from the father" to place 
"distance between the child and the father" and "to avoid 
contact between father and child;" (2) there was "no ev-
idence that there is a health issue on the part of either 
the child or [appellant] that justified the move. . . 
. The child does not have asthma;" (3) appellant was 
an "unreliable" witness with "totally inappropriate" de-
meanor on the witness stand on "many" occasions, and 
"is not a reliable fact giver;" (4) appellant "left the state 
of Maryland without giving prior notice" to appellee; 
(5) appellant "does discourage the child from calling [ap-
pellee] 'Dad' and from addressing the grandparents in 
appropriate terms as 'grandmother' or 'granddad'"; (6) 
"Matthew does refer to [appellee] in derogatory terms 
in front of Teresa," and Matthew's low opinion of ap-
pellee is "based exclusively upon the information that 
[appellant] has provided to [*38] these children;" and 
(7) appellant "is avoiding telephone calls" from appellee 
to Theresa, and that she "is unwilling to communicate 
with [appellee] in any reasonable way." 
The court considered highly significant its finding that 
appellant "gave no consideration to the impact of her 
conduct on either the child or herself." It observed that 
"there was no thought given to the consequences of re-
moving the child from the State of Maryland without 
resolving the visitation issue. . . . There has been 
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no consideration on [appellant's] part from what the im-
pact of blocking access of this child to this father would 
be. And it's simply because she doesn't like [appellee] 
and [she] is very angry at [appellee] over his failure to 
follow through to get married. . . . And I find that 
[appellant] is simply unable to separate her own needs 
from the needs of the child." 
(Emphasis added). 
We believe the evidence before the trial court sup-
ported its findings that appellant did not consider 
Theresa's best interests prior to moving the child out 
of the State of Maryland, and that she is incapable of 
separating her own interests from the best interests of 
her child. The relocation [*39] from Maryland is a 
modification that will particularly effect Theresa's best 
interests because of appellant's unwillingness to coop-
erate to foster a good relation between Theresa and her 
father. If Theresa were to live in a distant state with 
appellant, it would be easier for appellant to undermine 
Theresa's relationship with her father. Similarly, the 
long distance would make it harder for appellee to over-
come the obstacles created by appellant. The potential 
for maintaining natural family relations is one factor to 
be considered in determining custody of a child. See 
Montgomery County, 38 Md. App. at 420. As discussed 
in Section II, the relocation of appellant to another state, 
can, under Maryland law, constitute the material change 
in circumstances necessary to trigger the best interests 
analysis. StzDomingues, 323 Md. at 500-03. This case 
presents the proto-type of an instance when a relocation 
meets the Domingues and constitutional standards. 
The trial court had the opportunity to observe the wit-
nesses, and view all of the evidence. We cannot say 
that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding 
that there had been a material change [*40] in circum-
stances, and the best interests of Theresa warranted a 
modification of appellant's parental rights. Based on its 
factual findings, the court's award was not clearly er-
roneous. See Lemley v. Lemley, 109 Md. App. 620, 
627-628, 675A.2d596 (1996) ("A chancellor's decision 
founded upon sound legal principles and based upon fac-
tual findings that are not clearly erroneous will not be 
disturbed in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse 
of discretion."). 
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY 
APPELLANT. 
